نقدی بر تفسیر خواجه نصیرالدین طوسی از کسب عادت ارسطویی

نوع مقاله: علمی- پژوهشی

نویسنده

چکیده

هدف از این مقاله نقدی فلسفی بر تفسیر نصیرالدین طوسی از کسب عادت ارسطویی به عنوان برجسته‌ترین وجه تربیت اخلاقی در اخلاق نیکوماخوس است. از آنجایی که در بسیاری موارد مفسران ارسطو، تفسیر سنتی امثال خواجه نصیرالدین طوسی را تفسیر مکانیکی نام نهاده‌اند، ابتدا تلاش می‌شود تفسیر مکانیکی به تفصیل تبیین شود. نگارنده در ابتدا با بررسی نقدهای درونی و بیرونی تلاش دارد نشان دهد که تفسیر مکانیکی مبتنی بر مبانی رفتارگرایی است که انتساب چنین تفسیری نه تنها به ارسطو، بلکه به مفسران سنتی او مانند خواجه نصیر نیز ممکن نیست. در مقابل، ویژگی مهم تفسیر نصیرالدین در اخلاق ناصری، واسطه بودن اراده و تقویت آن دانسته شده است، به طوری که سایر اجزای نظام تربیتی وی مانند تنبیه و تشویق، ریاضت، الگودهی و ... را می‌توان از لوازم آن دانست. البته نباید گمان کرد که تبیین مبتنی بر اراده مطابق اخلاق نیکوماخوس است. لااقل دو نقد اصلی بر تفسیر نصیرالدین وارد است. اول آنکه چون اراده حیثیت التفاتی دارد و نیز اعمال فضیلتمندانه را نمی‌توان از موقعیت‌های خاص جدا کرد، تقویت اراده‌ی محض امکان تحقق ندارد. دوم آنکه فرونسیس که در اخلاق نیکوماخوس حائز اهمیت فراوان است و از نظر ارسطو فضیلت بدون آن ممکن نیست، در اخلاق ناصری به اندازه‌ی کافی مورد التفات قرار نمی‌گیرد، تا به طور کلی سهم عقل و تربیت عقلانی در تربیت اخلاقی از منظر نصیرالدین کمتر از میزانی باشد که مورد تأکید ارسطو بوده است. در پایان تلاش می‌شود نشان داده شود که تفسیر خواجه نصیر در جدایی حاد قوای نفس، که متأثر از جدایی عالم ماده از عالم مثل در فلسفه نوافلاطونی است، ریشه دارد و مورد تأیید ارسطو نیست.
 

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

A Critique of Tusi's Interpretation of Aristotle's Habituation

چکیده [English]

Introduction
When we discuss of moral education from the Aristotle view it comes to our mind one of the important theory namely " habituation theory". The concept of habituation as a lenghthy learning process that results in a kind of social and operational condition of the individual by bothe the immediate and the broder social environment into which the individual is embedded.
 
Method
The purpose of this article is a philosophical critique of habituation as the most prominent aspect of moral education in the Nicomachean Ethics basedon Tusi's interpretation. To achieve this goal, the method of content analysis and logical deduction was used.
 
Results
It was shown that although Tusi's interpretation, because of its emphasis on the part of the will in the process of habituation, cannot be called mechanical interpretation, there are still serious differences, like mechanical interpretation, between Aristotle's habituation in Nicomachean ethics and Tusi's habituation in Nasirean Ethics.
 
Discussion
I first try to elaborate mechanical interpretation, since in many cases commentators of Aristotle have considered the traditional interpretations containing Tusi's asmechanical interpretation. I try to show that mechanical interpretation is based on the principles of behaviorism, and we can’t attribute this interpretation not only to Aristotle, but to his traditional commentators like Tusi, because behaviorism refuses to acknowledge the internal workings of persons containing the will, which confirmed by Aristotle and his traditional commentators. This is while an important feature in Tusi's interpretation is to emphasize the will and strengthen it. The role of the will in Tusi's interpretation is so important that we can consider other parameters of his moral education as punishment and encourage, practical training, austerity, modeling and etc. to strengthen the will in trainee. Although mechanical interpretation cannot be attributed to neither Aristotle nor Tusi, Tusi's habituation in Nasirean Ethics isn't the same Aristotle's habituation in Nicomachean ethics. At least two major criticisms are made on Tusi's reading. First, since the will has intentionality, and virtuous acts can't be separated from certain situations, the reinforcement of pure will cannot be achieved. Secondly, Tusi doesn’t pay sufficient attention to phronesis, while it has very important role in the Nicomachean Ethics, as far as Aristotle says virtue cannot exist without phronesis. It causes the portion of reason and rational education in moral education in Nasirean Ethics is less than the Nicomakhean Ethics. In the end, it is tried to show that the interpretation of Nasir al-Din is rooted in the sharp separation of the powers of the soul, which is influenced by the separation of the material universe from the universe of ideas in Neoplatonism, which is not confirmed by Aristotle.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • The Nicomakhean Ethics
  • Aristotle
  • Nasirean Ethics (Akhlaq-i Nasiri)
  • Nasir al-Din al-Tusi
  • habituation

Aristotle (1980). The Nicomachean Ethics (NE), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Aristotle (1998). Politics (Pol), translated by C.D.C. Reeve, Hackett Publishing Company.

Burnyeat, M. F. (1980). “Aristotle on Learning to Be Good”, in Essays on Aristotle`s Ethics, Edited by Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, University of California Press.

Copleston, F (2008). A History of Philosophy: Augustine to Scotus, (E. Dadjoo Trans.), Tehran: ElmiFarhangi (Persian).

Drummond, I, Ch. (2016). John Duns Scotus on the Role of the Moral Virtues, a thesis in Department of philosophy in University of Toronto, Retrieved from https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/ 1807/72964/ 1/Drummond_Ian_C_201606_PhD_thesis.pdf

Karimi, R (2018). "Analysis and comparison of four interpretations of the Nicomachian Ethics" in Javidankherad, 14 (32), 135-164 (Persian).

Ritter, J., Gründer, K., & Gabriel, G (2015). Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie, Vo. 3, (M. Hoseini Beheshti & B. Pazooki Trans.), Tehran: IRIP & New-Arghanoon (Persian).

Rosenthal, F. (1974). “Plotinus in Islam: the Power of Anonymity”, in Plotino e il Neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente. Atti del convegno internazionale Roma, 5–9 ottobre 1970, Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Roma 1974 (Problemi attuali di scienza e di cultura, 198), 437–46.

Shayegan, Y. (1996). 'The Transmission of Greek Philosophy into the Islamic World', in S.H. Nasr and O. Leaman (eds) History of Islamic Philosophy, London: Routledge, ch. 6, 98-104.

Sherman, N. (1989). The Fabric of Character: Aristotle`s Theory of Virtue, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sorabji, R. (1980). “Aristotle  on the Role of Intellect in Virtue” in Essays on Aristotle`s Ethics, Edited by Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Steven, Ch. (2014). Practice and Enlightenment: Aristotle and Kant on Moral education, Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts at Dalhousie University.

Tusi, N, A-D. (1977). Nasirean Ethics (Akhlaq-i Nasiri), Edited by M. Minavi & A. Heidari, Tehran: Kharazmi (Persian).

Von W., & Georg, H. (1963). The Varieties of Goodness, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd Broadway House.

Winge, C. (2006). Moral Education Beyond the Teaching Right and Wrong, Springer.

Walzer, R. (1962). Greek into Arabic, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.